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statute
to defendants' counsel

defendants'

had actual and constructive knowledge

of the attorney's entitlement to a lien, as it applies to defendants' counsel who possesses
settlement funds, and as it applies to defendants' counsel who concealed both the actual
settlement and proceeds from that settlement from the attorney claiming the lien.

The course of the proceedings below and the disposition
Judge Hoagland granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss according to I.R.C.P. 12(b),
denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and
awarded Attorney Fees to Defendants according to I. C. § 12-121. The Court also granted
Intervenor's 1 Motion to Seal Records.

Facts
The Appellants, (Collectively "Clark"), were Plaintiffs' counsel and ultimately cocounsel with the Spence Law Firm in Forbush, et al., vs. Sagecrest, et al., Ada County Case No.
CV

1304325. ("Forbush case") (R. p. 9).
Two of the Defendants in the Forbush case were Anfinson Plumbing, LLC and its

employee Daniel Bakken, both of whom were represented by the Respondents, (Collectively
"Jones Gledhill"). (R. p. 9).

1 "Intervenor's" are Clark's former Clients, who are also represented by Jones Gledhill's counsel. (R. p. 35). Clark
believes that Jones Gledhill tendered the defense of this case to the Spence Law Firm as likely there is an
indemnification and hold harmless clause in the Anfinson Plumbing settlement documents.
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Clark hereby incorporates the "facts" as alleged in Plaintiffs' Afemorandum Filed In
Opposition

under seal

'Motion

Order). Clark also

in this case. (R.
incorporates essentially the same factual

allegations stated in Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss filed i~'Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-160421?2, (R. pp. 293
-296, filed on appeal under seal by Court Order), which however remains a public record in
Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Canyon County Case No. CV-2016-06347-c. 3 The Complaint

Clark filed in Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-1604217 is also in the
record on appeal. (R. pp. 329-342, which remains a public record in that case, but which is filed on
appeal under seal by Court Order).
Clark and the Spence Firm had a fundamental disagreement concerning the Spence
Firm's recommendation to the Clients in the Forbush case to pursue settlement with A.O. Smith
after the Spence Firm failed to present relevant evidence in response to A.O. Smith's motion for
Summary Judgment, which the Court ultimately granted. 4 The disagreement with Clark led the
Spence Firm to present an ultimatum to Clients regarding who would continue to represent
Clients in the Forbush case. (R. pp. 240-41 ). The Spence Firm informed Clark that should the
Clients choose Clark, the Spence Firm would withdraw and assert its lien on any proceeds Clark
obtained. (R. pp. 243-46).
Which is now titled, Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Canyon County Case No. CV-2016-06347-c, after a change of
venue.
3 Please see Clark's Motion for Judicial Notice filed in this Appeal.
4 Judge Copsey ruled that A. 0. Smith did not owe Plaintiffs any duty of care and granted summary judgment.
Because Judge Copsey so ruled any remaining defendants have no authority to include A.O. Smith on the verdict
form or allege A. 0. Smith somehow had some comparative fault.
2
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15.

Upon withdrawing from
defendants, including Jones Gledhill,

case,

sent a letter to counsel

which Clark asserted a

according to

the remaining
§ 3-205,

and requested that Respondents protect Clark's lien by including his name on any settlement
check. (R. pp. 12 and 15). Neither addressee responded or denied Clark's entitlement to a lien
under the circumstances.
Notwithstanding Clark's request, and Jones Gledhill's knowledge that Clark was attorney
ofrecord for Plaintiffs in the Forbush case for at least as long as Jones Gledhill's involvement in
that case, Jones Gledhill concealed the settlement and failed to protect Clark's interest in the
settlement funds. (R. p. 12). Jones Gledhill delivered the settlement funds to the Spence Law
Firm and proceeded to dismiss the Forbush v. Sagecrest case.
Clark's co-counsel, the Spence Law Firm, who also had knowledge of Clark's lien, (R. p.
232), also concealed the settlement from Clark and thereafter refused to pay Clark any fees to
which he was entitled for his three and half years of work in the For bush case, and thereafter
sought to extort a settlement from Clark by withholding Clark's attorney fees. (R. p. 234).
Clark has had to sue his former co-counsel to recover his entitled attorney fees because
Jones Gledhill failed to protect Clark's lien and the Spence Firm has refused to pay Clark his
entitled fees. Clark et. al v. Forbush et. al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-1604217. Clark filed
that action on March 3, 2016, and before filing suit against Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016.
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2. Whether the District Court

it awarded attorney

to Respondents?

3. Whether the District Court exercised appropriate discretion when it ordered documents
sealed that were already of record in a separate case filed in Ada County?
Whether the Appellants are entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal?
ARGUMENT

I. Legal Standards on Appeal
Statutory Interpretation

Recently the Idaho Supreme Court, in Hoffer v. Shappard, reiterated its duty to evaluate
statutes giving utmost regard for legislative intent.
'The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.'
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 'When
interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the 1iteral words of the statute .... '
Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515,521,260 P.3d 1186, 1192
(2011 ). 'If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body must be given effect .... ' Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada
Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This
Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous legislative
enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l 1\ifed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265
P.3d 502,508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170,177,369 P.2d
1010, 1013 (1962)).

Hojfer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 884, 380 P.3d 681,695 (2016).
The Supreme Court had previously stated that when interpreting statutory language, the
Court must interpret the words chosen by the legislature by their "plain, usual and ordinary
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., 151

P.3d 502, 506 (2011).
The Supreme

has also defined statutory ambiguity and concluded that a statute is

only ambiguous if the language could be construed so as to have two rational meanings. "A
statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.
Ada Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary A1otorcycle, 154 Idaho at 353, quoting Porter
Bd. o/Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 ldaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004).

In Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 76,625 P.2d 1072, 1079, (1981), interpreting
§ 3-205, the Supreme Court determined that the attorney lien statute specified five elements

a valid lien:
( 1) (T)hat there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution on equitable
principles,
(2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to secure the fund
out of which he seeks to be paid,
(3) that it was agreed that counsel look to the fund rather than the client for his
compensation,
(4) that the lien claimed is limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in the
litigation by which the fund was raised and
(5) that there are equitable considerations which necessitate the recognition and
application of the charging lien.
Then in Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 660 P.2d 928 (1983), the Supreme Court
distinguished the Frazee fact situation because there was no settlement "fund." "We note the
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a Skelton v. Spencer situation.
B. Standard for Review on Appeal
1. Statutory Interpretation. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over
which this Court exercises free review. Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d 524,
526 (2009), citing State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P .3d 850, 852 (2001 ).
2. Abuse of Discretion. "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly
perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the
correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Elliott v.

Murdock, 2016 Opinion No. 141, at *4 (December

2016), quoting O'Connor v. Harger

Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, ] 88 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).
IDAHO'S ATTORNEY LIEN STATUTE IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND
PROVIDES FOR AN ATTORNEY LIEN TO AUTOMATICALLY "ATTACH" TO ANY
SETTLEMENT "FUND"
The Idaho legislature, when it enacted Idaho's attorney lien statute, clearly and
unequivocally stated their intent that the attorney's lien attaches from the "commencement of the
action."
3-205. ATTORNEYS' FEES -- LIEN. The measure and mode of compensation
of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of
the parties, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an
action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim,
which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and
the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be
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Supreme
Bldg. Supply

ruled

statutes are

nature

v. SUAfPER, 139 Idaho 846,851, 87 P.3d 955,960 (2004). As remedial

legislation, Idaho's Attorney Lien Statute must be interpreted "broadly to effectuate the intent of
the legislature." Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 959
(2000). "Variously phrased, the intent of the law on this point is to allow the attorney an interest
in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures his right to compensation for obtaining the
or ·fund' for his client. Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 77,625 P.2d 1072, 1080
(1981).
In Frazee, the Supreme Court found that an attorney charging lien did not attach until the
party claiming the lien took "some affirmative act ... in reducing it to a judgment or order of the
court.

Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho at 466. However, as the Supreme Court noted in that case,

Frazee did not apply to overrule Skelton v. Spence. "We note the difference in the instant case

from the situation in Skelton v. Spencer, supra. There a "fund" was in existen." Frazee v. Frazee,
104 Idaho at 466. The "fund" vs. "no fund" situation is a key distinction when interpreting and
applying the lien statute that the District Court disregarded below. If there is a fund, then the
attorney lien statute applies. If there is no fund arising from the attorney's efforts, as in the
Frazee situation, then no lien attaches until it is "perfected" through some judicial proceeding.

In this case, like the Skelton case, there was a "fund" created by the Anfinson plumbing
settlement, so Frazee is not applicable and the District Court's reliance on Frazee was error. The
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no
seems to recognize the possibility of a charging lien

a 'non-fund' situation. Frazee v.

104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 928 (1983)." In re Harris, 258 BR at 14.
Moreover, while the "potential economic coercion" that concerned the Supreme Court in

Frazee is limited to the situation presented in Frazee where an attorney sought to attach property
outside of the case or not associated with any "fund" created by the attorney's efforts. There is
no similar threat or concern, however, when the claim of lien attaches to the fund created by the
attorney's efforts and limited by his contractual agreement with clients, which is the situation
here.
By the clear wording of the Attorney Lien Statute, the attorney lien attaches to the
fund when created.

From the commencement of an action, ... a party has a lien upon his client's
cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or
judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they
may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before
or after judgment. (Emphasis added)
I.C. § 3-205.
If there is no "fund," a situation not addressed specifically in LC. § 3-205, then an
attorney must sue to perfect the lien, and no liability attaches before the lien is perfected. That is
the limited ruling in Frazee. To rule otherwise and require an attorney to "perfect" their attorney
lien before liability could attach in all cases undermines the intent of the lien statute and conflicts
with the clear wording of LC. § 3-205.
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and amount of any liability can then be determined in litigation

necessary. That

"someone" certainly can be the client, co-counsel, or opposing counsel as each falls into the
broad category of" ... whosoever hands they may come .... " Here, Jones Gledhill knew Clark had
been Plaintiffs' counsel for several years, knew that Clark was claiming a lien, and knew there
was a settlement. Thereafter, Jones Gledhill either possessed or controlled the settlement funds.
Then, notwithstanding Jones Gledhill's knowledge Clark was entitled to a lien, Jones Gledhill
ignored and disregarded Clark's lien and delivered the settlement funds to the Spence Firm. As
Clark's lien arose by statute upon settlement, and the lien attached to those "proceeds" and in
··whosoever hands they may come," it was error to dismiss Clark's case. Clark has a cause of
action against Jones Gledhill for the amount of his lien or any damages associated and resulting
Jones Gledhill' s failure to protect Clark's interest, including the litigation costs Clark is
incurring to pursue his claim against the Spence Firm and his former clients.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED CLARK'S CASE
To the extent the District Court based its decision by interpreting I.C. § 3-205, that
decision is subject to free review. As nothing in the statute requires an attorney to do anything to
affirmatively perfect his lien, then the District Court's ruling that LC. § 3-205 requires some
"affirmative judicial action" to perfect an attorney lien is contrary to the clear and unambiguous
language in I.C. § 3-205. There is no language in this statute that even remotely addresses any
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to the extent that

District Court's decision is based on application of

existing case law, then the abuse of discretion standard applies. This Court should also reverse
as the District Court did not apply the correct legal standard and therefore abused its discretion
when it dismissed Clark's case.
The District Court ruled below, relying on Frazee and In re Harris, that as Clark had not
yet perfected his lien, no liability could attach to Jones Gledhill.
... Without affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his lien by "reducing it to a
judgment or order of the court," no authority exists to pay Clark any amount of
money on behalf of his former clients. See Frazee v. Frazee, I 04 Idaho 463, 466,
660 P.2d 928,931 (1983); In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 14 (Bkrtcy. D. ldaho 2000).
The law requires these affirmative adjudicative actions to strike a proper balance
between potential economic coercion and equity. (R. p. 68).
Had Clark taken some affirmative adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the
amount owed would have been reduced to an amount certain, taken the form of a
court order or judgment, which would have then been applicable to the parties and
their counsel. Violation of that order could have been enforced by contempt
and/or by a damage action against the parties and attorneys. (R. p. 68).
But Clark took no such affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his claimed
lien. Neither was there a contract between Clark and Jones Gledhill.
Consequently there was no order or contract that these Defendants violated. They
owed no contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect his interests. It was
Clark's duty to protect his own interests, which he failed to do. (R. p. 69).
Undeniably, the District Court's ruling is limited to its interpretation of Frazee. Again,
however, unlike the Frazee case, there was a settlement fund to which Clark's lien attached by
statute, the very situation in Skelton, and distinguished in Frazee. If the lien attached to the
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was

been addressed in the proceeding below. Based on the facts presented here, Frazee was
inapplicable, so the District Court's reliance solely on that case was error. Accordingly, the
District Court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard and should be reversed.
Moreover, even for the sake of argument that Frazee did apply, the District Court's ruling
ignores the fact that Jones Gledhill directly interfered with Clark's ability to "perfect" his lien. If
Jones Gledhill would have been liable had Clark perfected his lien, as the District Court ruled,
(R. p. 68), why then would Jones Gledhill escape liability when they interfered with Clark's

ability to obtain a perfected lien in the first place? Clark believed he had adequately pled that
Jones Gledhill had interfered with Clark's ability to timely perfect his lien in his Complaint. (R.
pp. 8-23). However, although Clark sought leave to amend his complaint to very specifically
plead that Jones Gledhill had interfered with Clark's ability to perfect his lien, (R. pp. 305-317),
Judge Hoagland summarily denied that motion and disregarded the additional facts as pled. (R.
pp. 74-76). The District Court also erred when it denied Clark's Motion to Amend.
The Supreme Court ruled in Frazee, that a "charging lien of an attorney is equitable in
nature .... " Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho at 466. Thus, all equitable defenses apply, including
unclean hands and estoppel. If Clark failed to timely obtain a perfected attorney lien because
Jones Gledhill, who knew Clark was asserting a lien, and who then purposefully and
intentionally withheld information from Clark, then equity should intervene to prevent Jones

- 11

Perhaps Clark seeks to perfect the claimed lien in the other case against the
former clients and Spence, but the settlement check and proceeds have already
gone through the hands of these Defendants, never to return. Thus, Plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of a claim that would entitle him to relief against
these Defendants.
To properly exercise its discretion, the District Court must apply the correct legal
standard. "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted 'unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief.' Gardner v. Holl(field, 96 Idaho 609,611,533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975).
When reviewing a district court's dismissal of a case under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho
102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). After drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, the Court then examines whether a claim for relief has been stated. Id." Taylor v. Maile,
142 Idaho 253,257, 127 P.3d 156, 160 (2005).
Here, the District Court should have considered Jones Gledhill's conduct in interfering
with and preventing Clark from taking "affirmative adjudicative actions," either as pied or
pursuant to Clark's timely Motion to Amend. Had Jones Gledhill informed Clark there was a
settlement when the settlement occurred and that Jones Gledhill did not intend to honor Clark's
lien or his request to put his name on the settlement check, then Clark certainly could have taken
the "affirmative adjudicative actions" the District Court deemed necessary. Instead, Jones
Gledhill concealed the settlement and delivered the settlement funds to the Spence Firm before
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an

it must

s

construed "broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature," then Judge Hoagland's decision
is contrary to the stated purpose and requisite interpretation of this statute. Moreover, Clark pied
facts that should have entitled him to some relief, so Judge Hoagland's dismissal was contrary to
the applicable standard when considering a Rule l 2(b) Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, even if

Frazee was applicable, the District Court failed to apply the correct legal standard and abused its
discretion when it disregarded Jones Gledhill's conduct that prevented Clark from timely
perfecting his lien.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
ATTORNEY FEES BELOW TO JONES GLEDHILL

AWARDED

The District Court also granted Jones Gledhill's motion for attorney fees pursuant to LC.
§ I

121, but denied the request according to

1

20 and 12-123. (R. pp. 205-215). Clark

now incorporates his argument above that the District Court erred when it dismissed his case. If
this Court reverses the District Court and reinstates the case, then Clark requests the Court
summarily reverse the award of attorney fees. In the alternative, Clark argues the District Court
abused its discretion when it awarded Jones Gledhill's attorney according to LC.§ 12-121 even
if this Court affirms the District Court's decision granting the Rule 12(b) motion.
An awarding Court must have an ·'abiding belief' the case was filed frivolously and
without foundation in order to award attorney fees. "A district court should only award fees
'when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
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)

an

contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and
without foundation.' Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court
concludes it fails as a matter oflaw. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107
Idaho 890,894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, '[a] misperception of the
law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is
whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be
deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.' Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893,
950 P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App. I 997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)."

Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,468,259 P.3d 608,614 (2011). Moreover, "[w]here a case
involves a novel legal question, attorney fees should not be granted under

§ 12-121."

Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640,652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005). citing Graham v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611,614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003).
The District Court granted some 5 of the requested attorney fees according to LC. § 12121, because the Court found that Clark had ignored Frazee .
. . .But Plaintiffs disregarded established case law finding that the failure to take
affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect an attorney's lien renders the claimed lien
unenforceable. Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466,660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983)
("The equitable source of the claimed charging lien necessitates that an attorney
take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to perfect and reduce his lien to a
judgment or order of the court"). If Plaintiff had perfected the lien through an
5 Jones Gledhill's Attorneys billed 77 hours for allegedly perfonned pursuing the motion to dismiss, and an
additional 54 hours (6.76 eight-hour days) just for drafting the motion to costs and attorney fees alone. (R. p. 294).
Judge Hoagland ruled these claims were "unreasonable and excessive."

Appellants' Brief - 14

§
not
a new or
§
argue that the law should be extended or modified. Plaintiff's "novel legal
question" merely argued that the Court should ignore established precedent,
which it has declined to do. (R. p. 212).
Actually, Clark argued in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that the statutory language
of Idaho Code § 3-205 controls, (R. pp. 255-60), and on reconsideration, that the Court should
distinguish Frazee because that ruling conflicted with the clear wording of Idaho Code § 3-205,
(R. pp. 319-22). Clark therefore did not pursue the case frivolously or without foundation.

Additionally, in opposition to Jones Gledhill's Motion for Costs and Attorney fees, Clark
argued this case presented the novel legal issue of opposing counsel's interference with Clark's
ability to perfect his lien. (R. pp. 181-82). Accordingly, even if Clark was required to perfect
his lien, there was no case law that addressed the issue presented here that the Defendants had
notice of Clark's entitlement to a lien, but concealed the settlement and delivered the funds to the
Spence Firm without Clark's knowledge. The facts below were sufficiently distinguishable from

rrazee, and Clark argued in good faith that Frazee did not apply. Clark's conduct in the case
was therefore not frivolous.
Clark also presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's liability, as
opposed to his client's liability, under this statute, which was not addressed in Frazee or any
other Idaho case. Clark prevailed on this issue as the District Court ultimately ruled that a
perfected lien under the circumstances would have been "applicable to the parties and their
counsel." (R. p. 68). The District Court also rejected Jones Gledhill's arguments in their Motion
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care.

1).

Additionally, Clark presented reasoned argument that notwithstanding the lack of a
"perfected" lien, liability attached according to the statute. Clark argued based on the undisputed
facts that Jones Gledhill had knowledge of Clark's lien claim, that there was a fund to which the
lien attached, and because Jones Gledhill possessed the liened funds but concealed the settlement
until after Jones Gledhill had delivered the funds, then Jones Gledhill should be liable, perfected
lien or not. (R. p. 181-82). Again, if the intent of the lien statute was to protect the attorney's
hard work and entitlement to fees, Judge Hoagland's decision effectively did just the opposite
and actually promotes subterfuge and deception by opposing counsel.
Finally, Clark argued in good faith that based on the Court's ruling that perfection is
ultimately required to enforce the lien, and as Clark was seeking to perfect the lien through
adjudication in the Clark v. Forbush case, at best the Jones Gledhill case was not yet ripe and
any dismissal should have been without prejudice. (R. p. 322).
The District Court also based the award of fees on its erroneous conclusion about records
being sealed in the Clark v. Forbush case.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' took action that increased the cost of litigation by filing
documents that were under seal in another case but were not sealed in this
case. Defendants responded by filing a Motion to Seal in this case, which the
Court granted. And ultimately, the documents did not add anything to the
Plaintiffs' case anyhow. (R. p. 212-13) (Emphasis added).
This simply is not true. Clark filed a motion to reconsider and showed the Court
that the documents and information that Judge Hoagland sealed in the Jones Gledhill case
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a

the same documents and infonnation that Judge Hoagland claimed was "under
seal

another case," were not in fact under seal and remained a public record.
While a Judge has discretion to award attorney fees pursuant to authority to grant

attorney fees under LC. § 12-121, the Court must reach its decision "through an exercise of
reason.

Judge Hoagland's myopic focus on the holding in Frazee, without due consideration to

distinguishing facts presented here resulted in a decision to award attorney fees that lacked
reason. Therefore, Judge Hoagland abused his discretion when he awarded attorney fees to
Jones Gledhill and that decision should be reversed.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SEALED
DOCUMENTS IN THIS CASE
As shown by Clark's Motion for Judicial Notice below, (R. pp. 48-52), which Judge
Hoagland denied, and Clark's recent Motion for Judicial Notice filed with the Supreme Court,
each record and all information Judge Hoagland ordered to be sealed in the Jones Gledhill case
was of record and unsealed in the Clark v. Forbush case. Notwithstanding Judge Hoagland
knew that the records sought to be sealed were unsealed and a public record in Clark v. Forbush,
Judge Hoagland ruled that the information should be sealed because the disclosure could result in
"economic or financial loss or harm to Clark's former clients."
As required by Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), the Court makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: The former clients' interest in
privacy of the confidential material predominates, given the privileged and
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stipulated to a protection order regarding
same material
in the other case where he sued his former clients and Spence. (footnote omitted)
The Court finds the materials sought to be sealed contain facts and statements that
could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to Clark's former
clients.
The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable, necessary and proper to seal
the requested material. Accordingly, the Motion to Seal is GRANTED and pages
two through five of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, and Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 of Eric R. Clark's Declaration filed May
4, 2016 shall be sealed. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of Eric R. Clark's March 30
Declaration, attached to Exhibit I of the May 9th Declaration shall also be
sealed. Finally, Exhibits l and 2 of Eric R. Clark's Second Declaration, attached
as Exhibit 2 to the May 9th Declaration shall be sealed. (R. p. 69).
While a District Court has discretion to seal records, it is hard to imagine any reasoned
basis to seal records or information in one case when exactly the same records or information
remains is in the public record and unsealed in another case in the same Idaho Judicial District.
as proven in Clark's recent Motion for Judicial Notice filed with the Supreme Court, the
very information remains in the public record and unsealed, despite a confidentially order in the

Clark v. Forbush case. Again, the District Court did not reach its decision to seal records in this
case through an exercise of reason and therefore abused its discretion.

VI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek attorney fees on appeal according to I.AR. 41, and I. C. § 12-121.
"An award of attorney fees is appropriate on appeal under LC. § 1 121 when the appeal has
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Teurlings v.

Afallory E. Larson Nka Mallory E. Martinez, 156 Idaho 65, 75,320 P.3d 1224, 1234 (2014).
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must
the claim with argument as well as authority'.
The Appellants reserve argument to support their claim for attorney fees pursuant to
§ 12-121 until after the Respondents have filed their brief, as prior to that time, Appellants have

no basis to argue the appeal was defended frivolously or without foundation.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred when it dismissed the Appellants' case pursuant to LR.C.P.
12(b) and denied the Appellants' Motions to Amend their pleadings and to reconsider, as the
Appellants' attorney lien had arisen by statute and attached to settlement funds possessed by the
Respondents. Consequently, the Appellants had stated a viable cause of action against the
Respondents and it was reversible error for the District Court to dismiss. The District Court also
erred when it granted, in part, the Respondents' Motion for Attorney Fees and Intervenor's
Motion to Seal Records. The Appellants therefore respectfully request this Court reverse the
District Court's rulings below and remand this case for trial in due course.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 2017.
, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Appellants
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